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    Abstract  
 
This article investigates the incidence of agglomeration 
externalities in a typical developing country, Ecuador. In 
particular, we analyze the role of the informal sector within these 
relations, since informal employment accounts for a significant 
part of total employment in the developing countries. Using 
individual level data and instrumental variable techniques, we 
investigate the impact of spatial externalities, in terms of 
population size and local specialization, on the wages of workers 
in Ecuadorian cities. The results show that spatial externalities 
matter also for a typical developing country, especially as far as 
urbanization externalities are concerned. Moreover, analysis of 
the interaction between spatial externalities and the informal 
economy shows a general penalization for informal workers in 
terms of benefits arising from agglomeration externalities. Finally, 
by investigating the possible channels behind the heterogeneity 
found in spatial agglomeration gains between formal and informal 
workers, we show that the advantages from agglomeration for 
formal workers may well be accounted for by positive sorting and 
better gains from job changes, while for informal workers they rise 
from positive learning externalities. 
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With the growth of big cities, analysis of the benefits of agglomeration economies has 
been pursued in a wide range of studies. From the empirical point of view, an 
extensive literature has analyzed the extent of agglomeration economies, measured by 
population size (or density) and industrial specialization at the local level. Their results 
have shown positive impacts of spatial externalities on productivity and wages (see 
among others Combes, 2000; Combes et al., 2008; Mion and Naticchioni, 2009).  
These studies have generally been carried out on developed countries. Less 
attention has been paid to the role of agglomeration economies in the developing 
world. However, the topic is relevant since the growth rate of the world’s urban 
development is being driven by urbanization in the developing world. Exploring the 
role of agglomeration economies in the developing countries is relevant to assessing 
the importance of urban economies worldwide, since the urbanization process taking 
place in the developing world is different from the old urbanization, mainly because of 
high poverty rates and poor-quality institutions (Glaeser and Henderson, 2017).  
A few studies have looked into the importance of agglomeration economies in the 
developing countries, focusing on those characterized by great geographical extension 
and large populations, such as China, India, Brazil or Colombia (see Chauvin et al., 
2017; Combes et al., 2015 and Duranton, 2016 ).1 The findings have shown an important 
role for spatial externalities in fostering productivity and wages, with impacts higher 
than detected for the developed world. However, these results have been found for 
emerging markets economies, while there is no evidence of studies focusing on more 
typical developing countries. Moreover, the developing countries are generally 
characterized by a large proportion of informal economy, which leads to a dual labour 
market (Fields, 1990; La Porta and Shleifer, 2014). Although the theoretical implications 
of the presence of informal employment on agglomeration externalities are unclear, 
assuming the non-existence of agglomeration economies for the informal sector is 
hardly justified (Overman and Venables, 2005). Also, Duranton (2009) points out that 
formal and informal sectors have strong interconnections, thus suggesting that in both 
                                                            
1 For a detailed review see Combes and Gobillon (2015). 
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sectors agglomeration effects generate benefits. Nonetheless, more formal studies on 
this topic are lacking (Overman and Venables, 2005). 
The aim of this paper is twofold. First of all, we analyze the importance of 
agglomeration economies for a typical developing economy, Ecuador. This country is 
shaped by a set of characteristics still unexplored in the literature such as average 
geographical extension and population size2, low and increasing urbanization rate, 
weak industrial activity, and widespread informal employment. Our first goal is to 
understand whether agglomeration externalities exert impacts similar to those detected 
for the developed world and/or the emerging economies. Secondly, we analyze the 
importance of the informal sector within these relations, exploring the heterogeneity of 
spatial externalities between formal and informal workers. Also, we shed light on the 
channels behind the detected impacts for each category of workers. Our paper 
contributes to the literature by directly and comprehensively analyzing how spatial 
externalities affect informal workers in a typical developing country.3 
We use repeated quarterly cross-section data from the Ecuadorean Labour Surveys 
(ENEMDU) available from 2005 to 2015, together with historical data from the 1950 
and 1990 censuses. We take Functional Urban Areas (FUAs hereafter) as units of 
analysis, since they represent a suitable economic definition of cities (OECD, 2013).4 We 
assess the extent of spatial externalities by analyzing the impact of two measures of 
agglomeration on individual workers’ real wages: population size and sector 
specialization at the local level.  
Two major methodological issues arise in estimating this relationship. First, there 
could be sorting of workers should the more skilled individuals prove more likely to 
be located in highly agglomerated areas. This issue has been taken into account in the 
empirical literature using individual panel data and performing fixed effects 
                                                            
2 Ecuador is not only in the middle of the world (en la mitad del mundo): it has a population size and 
extension close to the median of the developing countries (the country list comes from the World 
Economic Situation and Prospects, WESP, 2014, UN).  
3 Actually, there are practically no papers analyzing the impact of agglomeration externalities on 
workers’ wages in the informal sector. A few exceptions are Duranton (2016) and Garcia (2016), who 
focus on Colombia. However, Duranton (2016) does not directly test the impact of agglomeration 
economies for the informal economy, but infers its impact by comparing estimates for all workers 
with estimates for formal workers only, finding lower impacts for the latter group, and indicating 
higher impacts for the informal economy. Garcia (2016), focusing on density, provides a direct test of 
this relationship showing negative agglomeration externalities for formal workers and positive ones 
for informal workers. Nonetheless, neither of the articles investigates the channels behind the 
differences revealed, which is one of the main purposes of the current analysis.  
4 For details, see Section 3 and Obaco et al. (2017).  
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estimations, which control for unobserved individual heterogeneity (see Combes et al., 
2008; Combes et al., 2010; Matano and Naticchioni, 2012; Mion and Naticchioni, 2009, 
among others). However, for this paper, as for previous studies on developing 
countries (Chauvin et al., 2017; Combes et al., 2015; Duranton, 2016), the individual 
panel data that would allow to control for the unobserved individual heterogeneity 
were not available. Therefore, we are not able to control for individual unobserved 
heterogeneity in the course of our empirical analysis. Nonetheless, on the one hand, we 
will do our best from a methodological point of view by introducing into the 
estimation a broad range of individual controls to capture the individual heterogeneity 
(as in Duranton, 2016, and Glaeser and Resseger, 2010). On the other hand, we will 
make use of the information from a panel subsample of the original data that refers to 
stayer workers (not moving across cities) to get some insight into the sorting of skilled 
workers in bigger cities or highly specialized areas.  
The second methodological concern is the endogeneity due to possible simultaneity 
in individual choices concerning wages and locations. We will take this issue into 
account by applying an instrumental variable strategy, using deeply lagged values of 
our agglomeration measures and a geological attribute to build our instruments as in 
Combes et al. (2008), Combes et al. (2010), Matano and Naticchioni (2012), and Mion 
and Naticchioni (2009).  
Our results, based on the IV estimation strategy, lead us to the following findings. 
First, agglomeration externalities increase productivity and wages also in a typical 
developing country like Ecuador. In particular, we find that urbanization externalities 
entail a positive impact on individual wages with an elasticity estimate of 3.8%, lower 
than found for larger developing economies (Chauvin et al., 2017; Combes et al., 2015; 
Duranton, 2016). As for local industrial specialization, there is also a positive impact, 
lower than that attributed to urbanization externalities (0.9%). Also, we find evidence 
of decreasing returns to city size, since on excluding the biggest cities from the 
estimation, the impact of urbanization externalities increases to 9.1%.   
When we consider the informal sector in our analysis, our findings confirm that it 
matters very much. First of all, there is evidence of a wage penalization for informal 
workers, since their earnings are significantly lower (-7%) than those of otherwise 
similar workers employed in the formal labour market, as expected. When considering 
the interaction with agglomeration externalities, our findings show that informal 
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workers enjoy lower benefits than formal workers. In particular, wage increases for 
informal workers in an urban agglomeration are 1.6% lower than for formal workers. 
As for specialization, there are no longer wage benefits for informal workers accruing 
from working in areas characterized by a high level of local sectoral specialization. On 
the contrary, workers are slightly penalized. These outcomes might be partially 
explained on considering that informal workers are mainly represented by low-
educated workers, for whom we detect lower agglomeration benefits compared to 
high-educated workers.5  
Finally, we analyze the channels behind the detected impacts of spatial externalities 
on wages for formal and informal workers. In particular, we exploit the information 
derived from a panel subsample of our original data, and look to the sorting, matching 
and learning mechanisms to explain the outcomes of the analysis (Combes and 
Gobillon, 2015; Puga, 2010). As for urbanization externalities, the results for formal 
workers show that the urban wage premium is driven by the sorting of higher 
(unobservable) skilled workers and better quality of job match into larger cities. For 
informal workers, the gains from urbanization externalities are essentially driven by 
learning effects. As for specialization, for formal workers there is no evidence of 
sorting of skilled workers into highly specialized areas, while there is evidence of some 
wage gains from job changes, albeit lower than in highly populated areas. For informal 
workers, there is evidence of marked negative sorting in highly specialized areas, 
which helps to account for the wage penalization detected for this category of workers. 
To conclude, taking into account the fact that formal workers on average have higher 
skills than informal workers, these findings are in line with the previous literature 
indicating matching and sorting as channels behind the spatial wage premium for 
high-skilled workers, while learning externalities are more important for low-skilled 
workers (Matano and Naticchioni, 2016). 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the reference literature on 
spatial agglomeration in developed and developing countries. Section 3 describes the 
data and defines the variables used for the empirical analysis. Section 4 shows the 
methodology, performs the empirical analysis and draws the results, while Section 5 
concludes.   
                                                            
5 This finding contrasts with that of Duranton (2016), who observes higher benefits for informal 
workers from spatial externalities. However, and in contrast with the present paper, he does not find 
evidence of higher agglomeration benefits for higher educated workers.  
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2. Related Literature 
The idea of agglomeration economies fostering productivity and wages has been 
widely investigated in both the theoretical and empirical literature. Two of the factors 
most frequently analyzed are urban agglomeration and local sectoral specialization.  
Marshall (1890) was a pioneer in pointing out the productivity gains that may arise 
in bigger cities or from the concentration of a specific industry in a given location. The 
channels were formalized by Duranton and Puga (2004): the learning mechanism, 
which reflects the idea of knowledge spillovers and face-to-face interactions in 
agglomerated areas that enhance human capital; the matching mechanism, showing 
that agglomerated areas offer conditions for a better match between workers and firms; 
and the sharing mechanism, lying in the advantages generated by sharing indivisible 
goods such as facilities and risk in new investments, thereby cutting individual and 
firm costs. These mechanisms are behind both urbanization and specialization positive 
spillovers, the former being associated with highly dense areas, and therefore across-
industries, while the latter occur within specific industries located in the same area. 
From an empirical point of view, many works have analyzed the role of spatial 
externalities in fostering productivity and wages using both aggregated data (see 
Ciccone and Hall, 1996; Ciccone, 2002; Combes, 2000; among others), and individual 
level data (see Combes et al., 2008; Combes et al., 2010; De la Roca and Puga, 2017; 
Glaeser and Marè, 2001; Mion and Naticchioni, 2009). These studies take into account 
the empirical issues that arise in identification of the role of such externalities. In 
particular, they address the endogeneity of the relationship by using an instrumental 
variable strategy, while the role of the sorting of skilled workers in highly 
agglomerated areas is examined by means of a fixed effect strategy when using 
individual level panel data. The results have shown that worker sorting captures a 
large part of the impact imputed to spatial externalities on wages. Further, research has 
also revealed the relevance of dynamic gains in the biggest cities (De la Roca and Puga, 
2017).  
However, these studies have in general been carried out on the developed 
countries.6  Less attention has been paid to the role of spatial externalities in affecting 
wages in the developing countries. However, most of the urban population growth is 
                                                            




driven by the growth of cities in the developing countries and, interestingly, not in the 
largest cities (Royuela and Castells-Quintana, 2015). Thus, in line with Glaeser and 
Henderson (2017), we consider important to study whether agglomeration economies 
in the developing countries exert the same impacts on wages and productivity as in the 
developed world. Few works have addressed this issue. Chauvin et al. (2017) use cross-
sectional individual level data and IV estimates to analyze the difference in 
urbanization economies between similar-sized cities in the US, China, India and Brazil 
from 1980 to 2010. They show higher elasticities of wages with respect to urban size for 
China and India (around 8/9% to population size), and lower for Brazil, which is close 
to the US estimate (5%). Combes et al. (2015) focus on China and find agglomeration 
impacts on native wages of around 11%.7 Duranton (2016), taking the case of Colombia, 
finds an elasticity of wages with respect to population size of 5%, while Ahrend et al. 
(2017) find a similar magnitude in the case of Mexico (4.2%).8  
In contrast to the works analyzing developed countries, these studies are not able to 
control for unobserved individual heterogeneity due to the lack of a longitudinal data 
structure. Nonetheless, they make use of a wide range of individual level controls in 
order to take into account individual heterogeneity as far as possible (see Combes and 
Gobillon, 2015, for a discussion). Furthermore, a major concern in the case of the 
developing countries lies in the informal economy, which implies the presence of a 
dual labour market, informal workers representing around half of the labour force (La 
Porta and Shleifer, 2014; Maloney, 2004; Overman and Venables, 2005). Informal labour 
is usually represented by low-educated workers (Fields, 1990; Khamis, 2012) and 
associated with high levels of vulnerability and poverty, low wages and productivity, 
and lack of legal protection (Bacchetta et al., 2009; Fields, 1990). Consequently, in our 
view, a thorough analysis of the relevance of spatial externalities in a developing 
economy should take this dimension into account (Glaeser and Henderson, 2017).  
From the theoretical point of view, the literature has not yet reached consensus on 
the relationship between agglomeration externalities and the informal economy. 
                                                            
7 They also examine the impact of sectoral specialization at the local level and, by using OLS 
estimates, find elasticities of wages with respect to specialization of around 6%.  
8 Other related studies are Au and Henderson (2006), who analyze the case of China showing an 
inverted U relationship between wages and city size, and Lall et al. (2004) who, using firm level 
manufacturing data, look into the role of spatial externalities for economic productivity in India, 
disentangling the sources of agglomeration economies between those arising at the firm level, at the 
industry level and at the regional level.  
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Overman and Venables (2005) discuss this issue arguing that, on the one hand, the 
informal economy should decrease the gains from agglomeration economies due to 
crowding out effects on the formal sector, in line with the spirit of the Harris-Todaro 
(1970) model. On the other hand, they stress that this crowding out effect might not be 
fast enough to offset the advantages deriving from agglomeration. Furthermore, they 
point out that the informal sector itself could contribute to agglomeration economies 
because of the vitality of this sector, the existence of networks of small firms benefitting 
from labour market pooling and the role of the informal economy shown in the 
literature on clusters in developing countries. This spillover effect is also stressed by 
Duranton (2009), who argues that the formal and informal sectors are closely 
interconnected, so positive effects could arise within both sectors.  
From the empirical point of view, the role of the informal economy within the 
relation between spatial externalities and wages has generally been neglected. One 
exception is Duranton (2016), who uses individual level data for Colombia to carry out 
an indirect test performing estimations of the spatial externalities impact on wages vis-
à-vis on the one hand all workers, and on the other hand only workers with a written 
labour contract. His findings show that spatial externalities have a lower impact when 
only workers with written contracts are taken into account (around 4% compared to 
5% for all workers), thus inferring higher benefits due to agglomeration economies for 
informal workers.9  
3. Description of the data and definition of variables of interest 
In this paper we focus on Ecuador, a typical developing country characterized by low 
per-capita income, and low industrialization and urbanization rates as compared with 
other Latin America countries. The total population size is close to the median of 
developing countries (around 16 million inhabitants)10 and Ecuador is included in the 
group of countries that have gone through rapid urbanization since 1960.   
                                                            
9 Other related papers are by Garcia (2016) who, like Duranton (2016), uses individual level data to 
study the case of Colombia finding positive agglomeration benefits (in terms of density) for the 
informal economy and negative ones for the formal economy. However, he does not analyze the 
channels behind the detected impact, which is one of the purpose of this paper. Also, Harris (2014), 
using firm level data for the Nairobi’s handicraft industry, finds disadvantages in terms of 
agglomeration externalities in relation to the informal economy. Further, Bernedo Del Caprio and 
Patrick (2017) use firm level data for Peru to show lower benefits from agglomeration externalities 
for the informal economy. 
10 The list of developing economies is from the World Economic Situation and Prospects 2014, UN, 
Statistical Annex.  
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We use data from the Ecuadorean Labour Surveys (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, 
Desempleo y Subempleo - ENEMDU) provided by the National Statistics Institute of 
Ecuador (INEC). These are quarterly surveys (repeated cross-section data)11 that 
contain detailed information on Ecuadorean workers: labour income, hours worked, 
age, gender, ethnicity, education, occupation, previous migrant status and informal 
employment status. We also have information on the workers’ area/city of residence 
and sector of employment. In order to build the instruments for analysis, we combine 
these data with data from the population censuses of 1950 and 1990.12 Finally, we also 
merge these data with information on a geological variable associated with the city soil 
(PH, which measures the acidity of the soil) to check the robustness of our IV strategy. 
As spatial units of analysis, we use an international harmonized concept of 
economic cities, namely Functional Urban Areas,13 as in Ahrend et al. (2017). We 
identify 28 FUAs in Ecuador (see Figure A1, in the Appendix).14 The most populated 
FUAs are the capital city, Quito, and Guayaquil with more than 1.5 million inhabitants 
each, located in the Andean and Coastal region respectively.15 
The period of the empirical analysis is from 2005 to 2015 (44 quarters).16 We restrict 
the sample to workers located in the FUA areas (males and females) aged between 15 
and 64 years old who perform one job.17 We exclude workers employed in the public 
sector since their wage is set nationally, and focus on employees and self-employed 
                                                            
11 In particular, the survey is designed to sample specific buildings/dwellings (viviendas) and to 
provide information on the families living in the sampled buildings/dwellings. Moreover, 25% of 
the sample in each quarter is subsequently re-sampled for four non-consecutive quarters. Section 4.3. 
provides a more detailed description of the panel dimension of the database.  
12 1950 saw the first population census. The data are from the National Institute of Statistics and 
Census of Ecuador (INEC). 
13 Throughout the paper we will use “Functional Urban Area“ and “city” as  synonymous.  
14 In order to define a Functional Urban Area, we implement the following steps. We first identify the 
centers of the FUAs (urban cores), based on grid cells of high population density and population 
size. More specifically, these urban cores are defined as areas of continuous grid cells of high 
population density (500 inhabitants per km2 as minimum threshold for grid cells) with a total 
population size (summing up the continuous cells) of at least 25,000 inhabitants. These preferred 
thresholds are suitable for Ecuador for taking into account the relatively low density of this country. 
Second, we use a travel-time approach to group all urban cores socio-economically connected (thus 
belonging to the same FUA) and to define the boundaries of the FUAs. The final FUAs represent 
both the urban cores and the connected municipalities forming the hinterland. For further details, see 
Obaco et al. (2017).   
15 Quito and Guayaquil are the largest FUAs. The rest of the Ecuadorian FUAs are medium-sized and 
small, with a substantial gap in terms of population with respect to the two biggest ones (Cuenca, the 
third city in the country, has around 500 thousand inhabitants).  
16 This time span also avoids the years of the previous economic crises (the peak of the great 
recession was in 1999) and dollarization process (introduced as national currency of Ecuador in 
January 2000).  
17 We drop the 2.8% of workers with more than one job.  
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workers. We clean the dataset by dropping observations with missing data in our 
variables of interest as well as observations below (above) the 1st (99th) percentile of 
the workers’ real wage distribution, hours worked and real wages per hour.18 We end 
up with a sample of 408,197 observations for the period of analysis, around 9,300 per 
quarter. 
Informality is defined on the basis of the latest methodology implemented by the 
INEC (following the 2013 ILO guidelines): informal are the workers employed in firms 
with fewer than 100 employees with no tax identification number (Registro unico del 
contribuyente).19  
We use two measures of agglomeration effects. The first, total FUA population 
(Popc,t), proxies urbanization externalities capturing the effect of urban scale on wages, 
as in Duranton (2016) and Ahrend et al. (2017). This information is provided by the 
INEC. 
The second measure of agglomeration externalities is an index of specialization, 
which proxies sector specialization at the local level. We compute it as in Combes 










,,   
Where c stands for the city, s for the sector, and t for time. The specialization index is 
the ratio between the share of sectoral employment in the total employment in any city 
c and the corresponding share at the national level.20  
                                                            
18 We deflate wages by using the Ecuadorian national CPI. The base year is 2014. CPI information is 
provided by the Ecuadorian Central Bank.  
19 The INEC has applied different definitions of informality over time. The previous definition was 
classifying informal workers as those employed in firms with 10 or fewer employees with no full 
accounting records or tax identification number. The current definition (INEC, 2015) follows the 2013 
ILO guidelines and includes in the formal sector firms having tax identification numbers, even 
though they may not have full accounting records, in order to take into account cases where there is 
some legal justification. The classification divides workers into formal, informal, dwelling activities 
and non-classified workers. Formal and informal workers account for 90% of our sample, while 4% 
perform dwelling activities and 6% are non-classified workers. In the paper we only consider formal 
and informal workers. The new methodology was introduced in 2015 and applied to former surveys 
up to the second quarter of 2007 (included). Therefore, we will perform the analysis on informality 
from the second quarter of 2007 onwards to allow for conceptual comparability.  
20 Sectors are defined according to the ISIC version 3.1 at two-digit level. We use the ENEMDU 
surveys to compute the specialization index.  
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Table 1 presents the average of the real wages per hour (in US dollars) for the 
workers’ categories considered in the empirical analysis, at the beginning, middle and 
end of the period under analysis, as well as for the whole time span of the analysis 
(2005-2015) combined with their relative presence in the sample.  
Turning to the composition of the sample (Table 1, last column), it may be noted 
that males constitute around 60% of the labour force. The dominant ethnicity is mestizo 
(87%). Around 77% of the sample is constituted by low/medium-educated workers 
(educational levels are up to high school at most), while about 52% of the workers are 
employed in unskilled occupations, 35% in medium-skilled, and 13% in high-skilled 
ones. In terms of sector distribution, a relatively high percentage of workers (27%) are 
employed in the wholesale and retail trade sector and, in general, in the service sector 
(in total around 64% of workers); manufacturing, mining and agriculture account for 
just 26% of the total sample of workers (16% of which in manufacturing), construction 
for 10%. As for the dual labour market, workers in the informal sectors represent 
around 38% of the total workforce in the sample. Moreover, 44% of workers are self-
employed, while 56% are employees. As for firm size, 86% of the workers are 
employed in firms with fewer than 100 employees. Further, considering the regions, 
53% of the workers are located in the Andean region, 43% in the Coastal region, and 
the remaining 4% in the Amazonian region. As for the area of residence, around 89% of 
the workers live in an urban area of the FUA.21 Finally, 31% of the workers declare they 
have not always lived in the city where they currently reside.  
As for wages (Table 1, columns 1 to 4), a general increase in real wages per worked 
hour throughout the period analyzed may be noted. In addition, there is evidence of 
marked heterogeneity according to the dimensions considered: males earn around 10% 
more than females; white workers have a significant premium compared to the other 
ethnicities (12% above the average); wages increase with the worker’s level of 
education and job skill intensity, as well as firm size and previous migrant status of the 
worker. In terms of the dual labour market, wages are significantly higher (about 60% 
more) for formal than for informal workers. Further, wages are lower for the self-
employed than for the employees.22 As for the economic sectors, apart from the mining 
and quarrying sector, wages are significantly higher in the service sector than in 
                                                            
21 The interconnected economic areas of the FUAs may include rural areas.  
22 This is due to the fact that the self-employed are mostly informal workers.  
12 
 
manufacturing. In terms of regions, wages are higher in the Amazonian region (due to 
oil extraction), followed by the Andean region. Finally, and as expected, wages are 
significantly higher in the urban areas than in the rural ones. 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
 4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. The impact of spatial externalities on average wages  
In this section, we use data on repeated cross-sections for Ecuador from 2005 to 2015 to 













       (1) 
Where log(Wi,t) is the log of real wage per hour worked by worker i at time t. log(Popc(i),t) 
is the log of the total population size of city c where the worker i resides, while 
log(Specc(i),s(i),t) is the log of the specialization index for city c and sector s where the 
worker is employed. δ and θ are the parameters of interest (elasticities) that capture the 
extent of agglomeration effects on wages. Xi,t is a vector of worker’s characteristics 
including: age, age squared, female dummy, migrant dummy (indicating whether the 
worker has previously lived somewhere else), five categories for ethnicities, seven 
categories for education, twenty-seven categories for occupation (ISCO 88 at two-digit 
level), and job category (self-employed/employee) dummies. We also include a firm 
size dummy (over or under 100 employees) dfirmsizei,t, sector dummies (ISIC 3.1, at 
two-digit level23) Ss(i), dummies for the natural regions of Ecuador (Andean, Coastal 
and Amazonian), Ac(i), a rural area dummy within the FUA, Rc(i), and period 
(year*quarter) dummies Tt. εi,t is the error term.  
The OLS estimation of equation (1) may be affected by two main issues. First, there 
might be sorting of skilled workers into highly agglomerated areas. Generally, this is 
                                                            
23 In order to instrument the specialization variable, and due to discrepancies in correspondence 
between sector classifications over time (ISIC2 for the census 1990 and ISIC3.1 for the ENEMDU 
data), we chose to group the three ISIC31 sectors 50, 51 and 52 in a single group representing the 
entire Wholesale and Retail sector. This prevented significant loss of observations. Nonetheless, we ran 
a robustness check by repeating the estimation without this grouping (therefore not using around 
17,000 observations), and the results remain consistent. 
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taken into account by introducing individual fixed effects in the econometric 
specification. In our data, we cannot directly address this point since we would need a 
panel dataset to control for individual unobserved heterogeneity. Nonetheless, we do 
our best by introducing a wide range of worker control variables in line with Duranton 
(2016) and Glaeser and Resseger (2010).  Later, in Section 4.3 we will address this point 
better by exploiting the panel dimension of a subsample of our data. Second, there 
might be a matter of endogeneity arising from the possible simultaneity in individual 
choices concerning wages and locations. We address this point by using an 
instrumental variables strategy. As instruments, we use cities’ historical population (in 
1950) for total population size and the degree of specialization in 1990 for the 
specialization index. The idea is that lagged levels of total population size and 
specialization are correlated to the current levels of spatial variables, but they are 
assumed not to influence productivity and wages today. Further, in some estimations 
we also employ the soil PH as extra instrument to check for the validity of our 
instruments (Combes et al., 2010; Rosenthal and Strange, 2008). 
Table 2 shows the results of the pool estimation of model (1). Columns (1) and (2) 
show the OLS estimates, in column (1) only time, region and sector dummies being 
inserted as control variables, while in column (2) we enter the full set of control 
variables included in equation (1). Column (1) shows that the variables capturing 
agglomeration effects have significant and positive coefficients, with an elasticity of 
6.5% of wages with respect to total population size and of 1.1% with respect to the 
specialization index. On introducing the entire set of control variables specified in 
equation (1) the elasticity of wages with respect population drops sharply, from 6.5% to 
3.9%, while that of specialization remains below these figures (1.6%). Nonetheless, they 
are still sizeable effects, indicating that agglomeration externalities are at work also in a 
typical developing country like Ecuador, even if the magnitude of the impacts is lower 
than those found for the emerging developing countries in the case of population size 
(see Chauvin et al., 2017; Combes et al. 2015; Duranton, 2016). The magnitude of the 
specialization index is consistent with that found in other studies based on a similar 
definition of sector specialization at the local level (Matano and Naticchioni, 2012; 
Mion and Naticchioni, 2009). 
Columns (3) of Table 2 presents the IV estimates. The results show a non-significant 
difference with respect to the OLS estimates: the elasticity of wages with respect to 
population is 3.7%, while the elasticity for specialization is around 1%. This is 
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consistent with previous empirical findings indicating that endogeneity does not 
appear to be a major concern in the analysis of the agglomeration impacts on wages 
(Combes et al., 2010, Matano and Naticchioni, 2012, Melo et al. 2009). Column (4) of 
Table 2 presents the same estimates as column (3) with the addition of the soil PH as an 
extra instrument to test the validity of the instruments. According to the Hansen test 
(p-value=0.489), we cannot reject the null of the exogeneity of the instruments. Finally, 
in column (5) previous estimates are replicated excluding from the sample the two 
largest cities, Quito and Guayaquil, in order to trace any non-linearity in the 
relationship between spatial variables and wages. The results show a marked increase 
in the elasticities of wages with respect to city size, rising from 3.8% to 9.1%. This 
outcome is indicative of decreasing returns to city size. As for specialization, there is no 
longer a wage benefit for working in a highly specialized industrial area when 
excluding the two biggest cities, suggesting a key role of the best cities in exploiting 
these agglomeration advantages.24  
 
[Table 2 around here] 
              
 
4.2 Agglomeration effects and informality  
In this section, we take into account the dimension of the informal economy and 
directly test the role of informality within the relationship between spatial 
agglomeration and wages for a developing country. We restrict the analysis sample to 
a span between the second quarter of 2007 and the last quarter of 2015, because only 
throughout this period is the definition of informality consistent over time. To this end 





















     (2) 
Where Infi,t is a dummy that takes on a value of 1 if the worker is employed in the 
informal sector and 0 otherwise. This variable is interacted with our two measures of 
                                                            
24 As for the control variables, as expected the wages show a concave relationship with age. 
Moreover, females and workers residing in rural areas within FUAs are penalized, while wages are 
higher for those who have previously migrated. Further, wages are higher for employees than for the 
self-employed and increase with firm size and the workers' educational level and occupation skill 
intensity (not shown).  
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agglomeration: log(Popc(i),t)*Infi,t and log(Specc(i),t)*Infi,t. All other variables are the same as 
defined in equation (1). The parameter ρ captures the difference in average wages 
between informal and formal workers, all other factors held constant, while parameters 
γ and λ capture the differential impact on wages due to spatial externalities for 
informal workers with respect to formal workers. Thus, the significance of the 
interaction terms will afford insight into the spatial agglomeration impact on wages in 
the presence of a dual economy.   
Table 3 shows the results of this estimation. Columns (1) and (2) present the 
estimates by OLS, where again in column (1) the estimate includes as control variables 
only sector, region and time dummies, while in column (2) the full set of control 
variables specified in equation 2 are included in the estimation. First of all, observing 
the coefficient related to the informal dummy it is seen that on average, and in line 
with the descriptive statistics, informal workers are harshly penalized in terms of 
wages. In fact, the percentage difference in the expected wage between formal and 
informal workers is around -6/-7%.  When taking into account the heterogeneity in the 
agglomeration impacts between formal and informal workers, the OLS results show a 
general penalization for informal workers in gains from spatial externalities in terms of 
both urbanization externalities and specialization (-3% and -2.5% respectively in 
column (1)), which is however reduced when further controls are added into the 
estimation (-1.6% and -0.7% respectively).   
Column (3) of Table 3 shows the IV estimates. Compared to the OLS estimates, we 
observe no differences in the estimates for urbanization externalities, where the 
elasticity of wages with respect to total population size stands at 3.5% for formal 
workers again being lower by 1.6% for informal workers. As for specialization, the 
difference with respect to the OLS estimates is important, since on taking into account 
the endogeneity of the relationship between wages and spatial variables the benefits 
arising from working in locally specialized areas for informal workers disappear. 
Indeed, there is a slight wage penalization (around -1.8%).25 In the next section we will 
offer a possible explanation for this. For formal workers the wage elasticity with 
respect to specialization is 2.4%. Column (4) of Table 3 shows the IV estimates using 
the soil PH as an extra instrument. The instruments of agglomeration variables are 
                                                            
25 Testing the sum of the main effect and the interaction with informality for the specialization 
variable in column (3), we reject the null hypothesis that the total effect is not significant, while we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the total effect is not statistically different from -0.01. 
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exogenous, as confirmed by the Hansen test p-value (0.295), while the estimates remain 
unchanged. Finally, column (5) shows the IV estimates of column (4) excluding Quito 
and Guayaquil. In line with what we observed in Table 2, there is evidence of 
decreasing returns of agglomeration economies to city size, since the elasticity of wages 
with respect to total population size is 7.7% for the formal and 5.8% for the informal 
workers. As far as specialization is concerned, we now find a small wage premium for 
formal workers, albeit even smaller than for the sample with all cities: when excluding 
Quito and Guayaquil the wage premium for formal workers stands at 1.1%, while for 
informal workers there is still a slight negative impact (-1.2%). Interestingly, the 
parameter for informality remains negative, but is no longer significant, which is 
indicative of the strong effect of informality in the two largest cities.  
[Table 3 around here] 
 
Summing up, these results show that informal workers do not enjoy the same wage 
premium from agglomeration externalities as the formal workers and that they are 
severely penalized in the largest cities. These findings are at odds with the finding for 
Colombia by Duranton (2016), who, with an indirect test, finds higher benefits from 
urbanization externalities for informal workers. He interprets his results suggesting 
that the income of informal workers is more directly tied to local housing and 
transportation costs, which make them better able to reap the benefits of agglomeration 
externalities. Although the same mechanism may also be at play in Ecuador, in this 
case (and contrary to the case of Colombia), there is evidence of higher returns to 
agglomeration externalities for the more educated workers (Table A1 in the Appendix) 
– a finding in line with Bacolod et al. (2009), Glaeser and Resseger (2010) and Wheeler 
(2001). Since the more educated workers are more likely to be employed in formal 
occupations,26 this can (at least partially) explain the higher returns to spatial 
externalities for formal workers that we detected.27 We will now go on to present a 
more detailed picture of the mechanisms through which agglomeration externalities 
impact on formal and informal workers’ wages.  
                                                            
26 In particular, in our sample, 86% of the high-educated workers are employed in formal jobs, while 
only 14% are employed in informal jobs. 54% of the low-educated workers are employed in formal 
jobs, 46% in informal jobs. Moreover, high-educated workers account for 25% of the sample.  
27 In fact, the higher returns to agglomeration externalities for higher educated workers probably 




4.3 Analysis of the channels of the spatial wage premium: sorting, matching, 
learning and informality 
In this section, we aim to shed light on the channels behind the impacts found so far for 
formal and informal workers: we analyze the role of sorting, matching and learning 
mechanisms in the spatial wage dynamics (Combes and Gobillon, 2015; Puga, 2010). To 
this end, we make use of the data of a panel subsample of our original dataset. The 
ENEMDU survey is designed to sample families living in specific buildings/dwellings 
(viviendas), resampling of 25% of them being performed quarterly, following a 2-2-2 
panel structure: a building/dwelling may be sampled for two consecutive quarters, 
then left for the two successive quarters, and subsequently again sampled for two more 
quarters. This means that if a family has not moved house, it could be interviewed at 
most four times, covering a total time span of six quarters. We take the opportunity of 
the survey structure to identify working members of households sampled more than 
once and analyze their wage dynamics.28 As in the previous sections, we focus on 
workers aged between 15-64, with data on formality and informality consistent over 
time. We delete outliers29 and extreme observations in terms of real wages, hours 
worked and real wages per hour worked. With this procedure we arrive at a panel of 
70,029 observations for 31,200 workers residing in the same place.  
To the best of our knowledge this is the first time that the channels behind the 
spatial wage premium have been analyzed for a developing country by means of a 
panel dataset. Nonetheless, we must point out that the results of this analysis are 
limited to the short-run outcomes of the wage dynamics of stayers. Besides, we suggest 
taking these results with some caution due to the relatively small size of the sample.  
Since our aim is to understand the differences in the outcomes between formal and 
informal workers, we present the results separately for these workers’ categories.  
First of all, we characterize how sorting distributes across space. We define 
high/low populated (specialized) areas on the basis of the time-invariant median of 
population (specialization) in the original database.  As proxy for individual skills we 
use individual fixed effects retrieved from a panel estimation where wages are 
                                                            
28 More specifically, in order to identify household persons interviewed more than once, we select 
the persons living in the same building/dwelling –included in the panel subsample-, belonging to 
the same family, having the same position inside the family, with same sex, ethnicity, birth city and 
(should he/she have previously migrated) reporting the same city as the last place he/she has been 
living in.  
29 In particular, we identify outlier workers as those reporting data non-consistent over time 
regarding age, education, gender and previous migration status.  
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regressed on the set of observable characteristics used as control variables in the main 
analysis. Table 4, shows the results of the average skills in high/low-populated areas 
and high/low-specialized areas, for all workers (Column (1)), and for formal and 
informal workers (Columns (2) and (3)).  
On observing the skills distribution across low- and high-populated areas (Table 4, 
top panel), we find evidence of positive sorting. In fact, the fixed effect average is 0.047 
in high-populated areas, greater than in low-populated areas: -0.095. It is worth noting 
that this sorting effect essentially holds for formal workers, who see a 0.129 increase in 
fixed effects from low- to high-populated areas. Informal workers are characterized on 
average by lower unobservable skills than formal workers. Even though there is also 
an increase in the average of the fixed effects passing from low- to high-populated 
areas (+0.035), it is marginal compared to that of formal workers (less than one third of 
the increase). Hence, the higher wage premium (due to population) detected for formal 
workers is partially due to the sorting of skilled workers in high-populated areas. For 
informal workers, any wage premium that may occur due to population is not 
essentially driven by individual sorting.  
As for specialization, Table 4 (bottom panel) shows that on average there is mild 
evidence, if any, of negative sorting of skilled workers along the specialization 
dimension, since the difference between high and low specialized areas is marginal (-
0.021). On analyzing the different workers’ categories separately, it is seen that there is 
no sorting for formal workers, while the informal ones display a marked reduction in 
skills level passing from lower to higher specialized areas (-0.095). Therefore, the wage 
penalization observed in previous estimations for informal workers can be explained 
by the negative sorting of skills for this category of workers (which might more than 
offset other positive channels).  
Summing up, the picture of skills sorting shows that individuals with higher 
unobservable skills are generally employed in formal jobs and sort into larger cities, 
which helps explain part of their urban wage premium.  
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
We now go on to investigate whether the wage premium in high-populated/-
specialized areas in the short run can be attributable to better job-matches between 
workers and firms or to learning mechanisms generated while remaining employed in 
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the same job category. To analyze this issue, we use the data on the specific type of 
occupation of the worker, as we cannot know if he or she remains in or changes firm. 
Therefore, our analysis evaluates the impact on wages of a change in type of 
occupation, which may well proxy a better match between workers and firms in terms 
of tasks, while not addressing the impact of job change across firms within the same 
occupation, which might reflect a better match in terms of alternative dimensions, such 
as wages, working conditions', etc. The focus of our analysis then lies in detection of a 
wage premium derived from a specific matching linked to the type of occupation, 
which may occur across firms and also within a firm. We build a dummy signalling 
job-change with a value equal to 1 when a worker changes occupation. We consider 2- 
and 3-digit level occupations defined according to the ISCO88 classification.30 We then 
perform a wage regression of the log of the real wage per worked hour on the same set 
of observable characteristics used in the first part of the analysis (equation 1), now 
expanded with a job-to-job dummy, also interacted with the informal status of the 














      (3) 
 
where i denotes the worker, c the city, s the sector and t the time. Log(Wi,t)  is the log of 
real wage per hour of worker i, at time t. JTJi,t is the dummy for the change in 
occupation at time t, while JTJi,t*Infi,t is the interaction term between the job change 
dummy and the informal status of worker i at time t. The other control variables are 
the same as in equation (1) and (2), except for the occupation dummies, which are now 
introduced at 2- or 3-digit level according to the relative job-to-job digit level 
considered. Our parameters of interest are δ and θ, which indicate the elasticities of 
wages with respect to a job change (compared to no job change) and its differential 
impact should the worker’s status be informal. We run an OLS regression, because for 
most individuals we have only two observations available, with one lost when the JTJ 
dummy is computed. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.   
                                                            
30 It is worth noting that from 2013 to 2015 the ISCO codification applied was ISCO08. Therefore, 
using the appropriate correspondence table and the technique applied by the OECD Employment 
Outlook 2017 illustrated in Annex 3.A4, we map the ISCO08 into the ISCO88 and obtain a 
homogenous ISCO88 classification for the entire period of the analysis. Nonetheless, we carry out a 
robustness check to take into account this change in classification over time.   
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With this specification we can see whether wages react positively to a change in 
occupation, thus suggesting that the wage increases due to a better quality match as 
compared with remaining in the same kind of occupation.31 If, on the contrary, there is 
a penalization due to job change, it means that workers gain relatively more remaining 
in the same occupation, thus suggesting the presence of learning effects. We perform 
this estimation for all workers and for workers in high-populated or high-specialized 
areas separately in order to see if these mechanisms act differently in such areas, thus 
contributing to an understanding of the channels behind the spatial wage premium. In 
addition, we decided to focus on workers not changing their formal or informal status 
when going through job change. In this way we avoid confusing the impact of an 
occupation change with that of a change in formality status.32   
Table 5 shows the results. Columns (1), (2) and (3) present the estimates when 
defining the occupation change at the 2-digit level, columns (4), (5) and (6) when 
defining the occupation change at the 3-digits level.33  
As for job-quality match, this appears to be a channel for the wage increase of 
formal workers, especially in high-populated areas. In fact, the elasticity of wage to job 
change is in general 2.9%, and increases to 3.7% in high-populated areas when 
considering a change at the 2-digit level. At the 3-digit level the wage premiums are 
similar. Hence, for formal workers, job changes entail a higher wage premium 
compared to remaining in the same job, especially in high-populated areas. This 
outcome points to the matching channel as one of the factors behind the urban wage 
premium for this category of workers. In high-specialized areas, the job change 
dummy still has a positive impact, but smaller (around 2/2.7%) and close to the 
average.  
                                                            
31 As for descriptive statistics of job changes at 2-digits level, it is worth noting that around half of job 
changes for both formal and informal workers represent an upgrade in the occupational position. 
32 Observations accounting for workers who change status between formal and informal or the other 
way around represent 16% of the total number of observations. We carried out a robustness check 
using all sample observations and the results remain robust, although the impacts are lower in 
magnitude (Table A2 in the Appendix).  
33 As previously mentioned, there was an interruption in the ISCO data classification between 2012 
and 2013. We therefore mapped the ISCO08 classification into the ISCO88 classification for the years 
2013, 2014 and 2015. Since in this section we estimate the impact of a job change on wages according 
to ISCO classification, we decided to run a robustness check using the original ISCO classification 
(ISCO88 up to 2012 and ISCO08 as from 2013) to compute the job change, while at the same time 
excluding the observations affected during the change period. The results are shown in Table A3 in 
the Appendix and remain robust to the classification considered.  
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As for the informal workers, the patterns are different: on average a change in 
occupation penalizes wages compared to remaining in the same job: the total effect is -
1.2% in column (1) and -3.9% in column (4). Moreover, the wage penalty increases with 
increasing size of the FUAs (total effect equal to -2.9% and -5.1% in column (2) and (5) 
respectively). This suggests that for informal workers the channels through which 
spatial externalities exert an effect on wages is through learning mechanisms.  In 
highly specialized areas, the total net effect of a job change for informal workers is not 
statistically different from 0.  
Overall, if we consider that informal workers are generally characterized by lower 
skills than formal workers, these findings are consistent with those in Matano and 
Naticchioni (2016), where it is seen that in high density areas skilled workers gain 
relatively more from job change, while unskilled workers benefit from positive 
knowledge spillovers.  
[Table 5 around here] 
 
To sum up, analysis of the channels through which spatial wage premiums arise 
shows a difference between formal and informal workers. As for the urban wage 
premium, the impacts for formal workers are driven by both the sorting of high 
(unobserved) skilled workers into high-populated areas and by a better quality of job 
matching. On the other hand, for informal workers the gains from agglomeration are 
mostly driven by positive knowledge spillovers when they are employed in the same 
occupation. As for specialization, the channels driving the previous results still seem to 
lies in job-quality matching for formal workers, while for informal workers there is no 
significant difference between job-matching effects and learning effects within an 
occupation. In addition, there is evidence of negative sorting for this category of 
workers, to the effect that those characterized by lower unobservable skills sort into 
highly-specialized areas, which help to explain the net negative impact detected for 
this category of workers.34  
                                                            
34 One last important channel to investigate is the one regarding the experience acquired in the 
biggest cities as shown in De la Roca and Puga (2017). In this case, it is not possible to correctly 
evaluate the relevance of this issue. In fact, in our data we have information only on whether 
someone has migrated in the past combined with information about the last place of residence. 
Therefore, we are not able to trace the migration pattern of migrants, because we cannot know 





In this paper we have explored the role of agglomeration economies, in terms of total 
population size and sector specialization at the local level, on the wages of workers for 
a typical developing country, Ecuador. We have found positive and significant impacts 
on wages deriving from spatial agglomeration. In particular, the elasticity of wages 
with respect to total population size is as great as 3.8%, while with respect to 
specialization it is 0.9%. Moreover, we have also addressed the role of the informal 
economy in this relationship, analyzing the heterogeneity of the spatial wage premium 
across formal and informal workers in order to take into account the interaction 
between spatial agglomeration and the presence of a dual labour market – a common 
characteristic of most developing countries. Our findings show that informal workers 
are penalized, since the benefits accruing from spatial externalities are reduced and, in 
the case of specialization, even cancelled. This shows the importance of considering the 
role of the duality of the labour market in addressing the relationship between wages 
and spatial externalities. Furthermore, we also sought to identify the channels through 
which these wage gains occur across worker categories. The results show evidence of 
sorting and higher gains deriving from better job match in highly-populated areas for 
formal workers, as opposed to learning advantages for informal workers. In highly 
specialized areas, the wage premium due to matching effects still holds for formal 
workers, while the learning and matching effects are similar for informal workers. In 
addition, the latter appear to be negatively sorted into these areas, thus explaining the 
wage penalization found for this category of workers along the specialization 
dimension. Taking into account that formal workers are relatively higher skilled and 
educated than informal workers, these findings are in line with the previous literature 
showing better gains due to good matches for high-skilled workers and greater 
advantages due to learning externalities for low-skilled workers (Matano and 
Naticchioni, 2016).  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
model 5 adding a migrant dummy and the interaction with the biggest cities as migrant’s last place 
of residence, finding higher wages on average for migrant workers, but a non-significant interaction 
with the big cities dummy. The main findings remain confirmed. These estimations are available 
upon request. In any case, we would like to stress that it has been shown that this mechanism 
probably acts as complementary to the other mechanisms detected (see Matano and Naticchioni, 
2016); we are therefore quite confident that failing to correctly investigate this aspect should not 
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Worker data 2005 2010 2015 All % 
Total 1.86 1.96 2.52 2.17 100
Gender          
Male 1.91 2.04 2.62 2.26 60.59
Female 1.77 1.84 2.36 2.04 39.41
Ethnicity
Indigenous 1.31 1.44 1.81 1.65 4.75
White 2.26 2.29 3.02 2.44 4.03
Mestizo* 1.87 1.98 2.58 2.21 87.13
Black 1.43 1.64 2.14 1.83 2.61
Mulatos** 1.40 1.72 2.29 1.83 1.48
Education level
None 1.09 1.23 1.51 1.33 1.90
Literacy 1.28 1.32 1.57 1.44 0.29
School 1.39 1.54 1.97 1.69 33.45
High School 1.75 1.86 2.34 2.04 41.77
Technical 2.23 2.50 3.22 2.73 1.03
University 2.90 2.89 3.61 3.17 20.88
Post-Univ. Degree 4.38 4.92 6.34 5.43 0.68
Occupation 
Legislators, Professionals and Technicians 3.23 3.45 4.40 3.76 12.84
Clerks, Service Workers and Skilled Agricultural 
and Fishery Workers 1.73 1.91 2.32 2.06 35.27
Crafts and Trade Workers, Plant and Machine 
Operators, Elementary Occupations 1.57 1.67 2.18 1.86 51.88
Job Category (1)
Dependent workers 1.77 2.01 2.70 2.24 56.45
Self-employed 1.96 1.90 2.28 2.09 43.55
Job Category (2)
Formal - 2.38 3.02 2.68 62.10
Informal - 1.52 1.77 1.66 37.90
Economic Sector
Agriculture, Fishing 1.43 1.57 1.91 1.71 9.25
Mining and Quarrying 2.89 3.32 4.41 3.83 0.52
Manufacturing 1.79 1.97 2.50 2.16 15.82
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 2.60 2.60 3.24 3.05 0.19
Construction 1.75 1.90 2.44 2.10 9.82
Wholesale and Retail Trade 1.88 1.94 2.45 2.12 27.49
Hotels and Restaurants 1.76 1.88 2.38 2.10 6.44
Transport, Storage and Communications 2.04 2.01 2.53 2.25 9.03
Financial Intermediation 2.77 3.33 4.34 3.68 1.43
Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities 2.41 2.43 2.95 2.65 5.95
Private Education, Health and Social Work 2.47 2.68 3.55 2.93 5.08
Other Service Activities 1.46 1.60 2.19 1.78 8.98
Firm size
<100 workers 1.81 1.86 2.33 2.05 86.54
>=100 workers 2.25 2.67 3.56 2.95 13.46
Region
Andean 2.02 2.11 2.67 2.31 52.86
Coastal 1.68 1.78 2.29 1.99 43.20
Amazonian 2.01 2.11 2.56 2.34 3.93
Area
Urban 1.90 2.03 2.60 2.23 89.09
Rural 1.32 1.51 2.00 1.71 10.92
Migrant 
Yes 1.87 2.04 2.56 2.24 31.00
No 1.85 1.94 2.49 2.14 69.00
Total Obs. 29,351 37,329 54,208 408,197
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. Real Wage per Hour and Sample Composition by Worker Categories
Mean Real Wage per Hour (US dollars)
Notes: Occupation is defined according to ISCO88, sector according to ISIC 3.1. *Mestizo is the category for mixed
white/indigenous race. **Mulato is the category for mixed white/black race.  
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS IV IV IV
Log(Pop) 0.065*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.091***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Log(Specialization) 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Female dummy -0.157*** -0.157*** -0.157*** -0.172***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Age 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.035***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Age squared -3.63e-04*** -3.63e-04*** -3.63e-04*** -3.81e-04***
(6.19e-06) (6.19e-06) (6.19e-06) (7.56e-06)
Migrant dummy 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.035***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Firm size 0.194*** 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.212***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Rural dummy -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.059***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Ethnicity dummies no yes yes yes yes
Education dummies no yes yes yes yes
Job category dummies no yes yes yes yes
Occupation dummies no yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Region dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.622*** -0.665*** -0.646*** -0.647*** -1.458***
(0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.108)
Observations 408,197 408,197 408,197 408,197 275,138
R-squared 0.13 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.28
48,134 32,029 19,441
0.489 0.439
Weak identification test (F-value)
Over identification test (p-value)
Standard errors clustered at worker level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Occupation is codified
according to ISCO 88, two-digit level, sector according to ISIC 3.1, two-digit level. Total population size is
instrumented using total population in 1950, while specialization is instrumented using the specialization level
in the 1990. Soil PH is used as an extra instrument in column (4) and (5). The two largest cities, Guayaquil and
Quito, are excluded from the regression in Column (5).
Table 2: OLS and IV regressions of wages on the spatial variables. Dependent variable: log of
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS IV IV IV 
Log(Pop) 0.058*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.077***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Log(Pop)*Informal dummy -0.030*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Log(Spec) 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Log(Spec)*Informal dummy -0.025*** -0.007* -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.023***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Informal dummy -0.057*** -0.070*** -0.067*** -0.066*** -0.030
(0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.066)
Female dummy -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.165***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.034***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Age squared -3.54e-04*** -3.54e-04*** -3.54e-04*** -3.74e-04***
(7.13e-06) (7.13e-06) (7.13e-06) (8.70e-06)
Migrant dummy 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.031***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Firm size 0.151*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.157***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Rural dummy -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.044***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ethnicity dummies no yes yes yes yes
Education dummies no yes yes yes yes
Job category dummies no yes yes yes yes
Occupation dummies no yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Region dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.022 -0.220* -0.201* -0.203* -1.070***
(0.018) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.172)
Observations 304,631 304,631 304,631 304,631 208,618
R-squared 0.21 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.30
Weak identification test (F-value) 14,250 10,954 9,296
Over identification test (p-value) 0.295 0.976
Table 3: OLS and IV regressions of wages on the spatial variables and interaction with
informality. Dependent variable: log of real worker's wage per hour.
Standard errors clustered at worker level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Occupation is codified
according to ISCO 88, two-digit level, sector according to ISIC 3.1, two-digit level. Total population size is
instrumented using total population in 1950, while specialization is instrumented using the specialization level in 
the 1990. Soil PH is used as an extra instrument in column (4) and (5). The two largest cities, Guayaquil and






Table 4: Mean Fixed Effects across Space
All Formal Informal
Low Population -0.095 0.014 -0.251
High Population 0.047 0.143 -0.216
Low Specialization 0.011 0.108 -0.184
High Specialization -0.010 0.104 -0.279




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All High-Pop High-Spec All High-Pop High-Spec
Job change 0.029*** 0.037*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.035*** 0.020**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Job change*Informal -0.041** -0.066*** -0.009 -0.068*** -0.086*** -0.030
(0.016) (0.022) (0.023) (0.015) (0.020) (0.022)
Informal -0.296*** -0.289*** -0.363*** -0.291*** -0.288*** -0.359***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019)
Female dummy -0.152*** -0.141*** -0.136*** -0.157*** -0.146*** -0.143***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
Age 0.036*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.036***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age squared -3.98e-04*** -4.24e-04*** -4.09e-04*** -3.90e-04*** -4.15e-04*** -3.98e-04***
(2.30e-05) (2.78e-05) (3.12e-05) (2.29e-05) (2.77e-05) (3.12e-05)
Migrant dummy 0.043*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.042*** 0.033*** 0.035***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Firm size 0.161*** 0.160*** 0.147*** 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.148***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Rural dummy -0.088*** -0.131*** -0.087*** -0.081*** -0.120*** -0.078***
(0.016) (0.023) (0.023) (0.016) (0.023) (0.023)
Ethnicity dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Education dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Job category dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Occupation dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.252 0.175 0.076 0.403* 0.241 0.439***
(0.167) (0.183) (0.200) (0.227) (0.240) (0.112)
Observations 32,659 22,599 17,509 32,659 22,599 17,509
R-squared 0.37 0.39 0.40 0.38 0.40 0.41
Notes: Standard errors clustered at worker level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Occupation
is coded according to ISCO88 2-digit level from columns (1) to (3) and ISCO88 3-digit level from columns
(4) to (6). The sector is coded according to ISIC 3.1 2-digit level. From column (1) to (3) job change is
considered at 2-digit level, from column (4) to (6) job change is considered at 3-digit level.




































  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS IV IV IV 
Log(Pop) 0.048*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.069***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Log(Pop)*High-education dummy 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.013**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Log(Spec) 0.018*** 0.008*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.008
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Log(Spec)*High-education dummy 0.023*** 0.010*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.030***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
High-education dummy 0.134*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 0.025
(0.030) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.076)
Informal dummy -0.287*** -0.287*** -0.287*** -0.280***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Female dummy -0.152*** -0.152*** -0.152*** -0.166***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.035***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Age squared -3.81e-04*** -3.81e-04*** -3.81e-04*** -4.01e-04***
(7.14e-06) (7.14e-06) (7.14e-06) (8.71e-06)
Migrant dummy 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.026***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Firm size 0.156*** 0.157*** 0.157*** 0.163***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Rural dummy -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.063***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ethnicity dummies no yes yes yes yes
Job category dummies no yes yes yes yes
Occupation dummies no yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Region dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.181*** 0.066 0.097 0.095 -0.748***
(0.017) (0.116) (0.115) (0.115) (0.170)
Observations 304,631 304,631 304,631 304,631 208,618
R-squared 0.19 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.29
Weak identification test (F-value) 4,714 3,770 9,233
Over identification test (p-value) 0.263 0.925
Table A1: OLS and IV regressions of wages on the spatial variables and interaction with high
education. Dependent variable: log of real worker's wage per hour.
Standard errors clustered at worker level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. High-educated workers
are those with education level higher than high school (i.e. technical, university and post-university education).
Occupation is codified according to ISCO 88, two-digit level, sector according to ISIC 3.1, two-digit level. Total
population size is instrumented using total population in 1950, while specialization is instrumented using the
specialization level in the 1990. Soil PH is used as an extra instrument in column (4) and (5). The two largest








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All High-Pop High-Spec All High-Pop High-Spec
Job change 0.021*** 0.028*** 0.020** 0.020*** 0.026*** 0.013
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Job change*Informal -0.034** -0.053*** -0.012 -0.057*** -0.061*** -0.020
(0.014) (0.018) (0.020) (0.014) (0.018) (0.020)
Informal -0.253*** -0.250*** -0.300*** -0.245*** -0.252*** -0.296***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.016)
Observations 38,829 26,272 20,505 38,829 26,272 20,505
R-squared 0.34 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.37 0.38
Notes: Standard errors clustered at worker level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The other
control variables are a female dummy, age, age squared, firm size, and dummies for education, ethnicity,
occupation (ISCO88 2-digit level, in columns (1) to (3) and ISCO88 3-digit level in columns (4) to (6)), sector
(ISIC 3.1 2-digit level), migrant status, rural area, macro-areas and time. From column (1) to (3) job change is
considered at 2-digit level, from column (4) to (6) job change is considered at 3-digit level.
Table A2: Job change impacts on wages by formal/informal workers and size area, including workers who





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All High-Pop High-Spec All High-Pop High-Spec
Job change 0.033*** 0.040*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.036*** 0.019*
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Job change*Informal -0.063*** -0.088*** -0.030 -0.082*** -0.097*** -0.040*
(0.018) (0.023) (0.025) (0.017) (0.022) (0.024)
Informal -0.293*** -0.286*** -0.357*** -0.286*** -0.284*** -0.353***
(0.013) (0.017) (0.020) (0.014) (0.018) (0.021)
Observations 28,341 19,512 15,102 28,341 19,512 15,102
R-squared 0.37 0.39 0.40 0.38 0.40 0.41
Table A3: Job change impacts on wages by formal/informal workers and size area. Original ISCO
codification and excluding individuals during the change in ISCO versions.
Notes: Standard errors clustered at worker level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The other control
variables are a female dummy, age, age squared, firm size, and dummies for education, ethnicity, occupation (ISCO88
2-digit level, in columns (1) to (3) and ISCO88 3-digit level in columns (4) to (6)), sector (ISIC 3.1 2-digit level), migrant
status, rural area, macro-areas and time. From column (1) to (3) job change is considered at 2-digit level, from column
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